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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
___________ 
 
No. 17-2528 
___________ 
 
GABRIEL CASSELL, 
   Appellant 
 
v. 
 
THE COUNTY OF MONTGOMERY PENNSYLVANIA; MONTGOMERY COUNTY 
DOMESTRIC RELATIONS; THE COUNTY OF RAMSEY MINNESOTA; OLIVIA J. 
SEWARD; JENNIFER KEKKING; JULIE LA FLEUR 
____________________________________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania 
(D.C. Civil Action No. 2:17-cv-01077) 
District Judge:  Honorable Wendy Beetlestone 
____________________________________ 
 
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
July 13, 2018 
Before:  GREENAWAY, JR., BIBAS and ROTH, Circuit Judges 
 
(Opinion filed: June 21, 2019) 
___________ 
 
OPINION* 
___________ 
 
 
PER CURIAM 
                                              
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 
constitute binding precedent. 
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 Gabriel Cassell, proceeding pro se, appeals from the District Court’s order 
dismissing as moot his motion for a preliminary injunction.  For the following reasons, 
we will dismiss the appeal as moot.  
 In March 2017, Cassell filed a pro se civil rights action in the United States 
District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania.  Cassell alleged several violations 
of his constitutional rights related to the enforcement of a child support order that was 
issued by a Minnesota state court.  Cassell’s complaint named as defendants the County 
of Montgomery, Pennsylvania (“Montgomery County”), the Montgomery County 
Domestic Relations Division (“MCDR”), Jennifer Hekking, Olivia J. Seward, the County 
of Ramsey, Minnesota (“Ramsey County”), and Julie La Fleur.  At the time Cassell filed 
his complaint, he also filed a motion for preliminary injunction against all defendants.  
Defendants Montgomery County, MCDR, Hekking, and La Fleur filed motions to 
dismiss for failure to state a claim.  By order entered June 21, 2017, the District Court 
granted the defendants’ motions and dismissed Cassell’s motion for a preliminary 
injunction as moot.  Cassell appealed the dismissal of his motion for a preliminary 
injunction.  Subsequently, the District Court dismissed all claims against the remaining 
defendants, Ramsey County and Seward, for failure to prosecute pursuant to Federal Rule 
of Civil Procedure 4(m).1  On appeal, Cassell does not present an argument against the 
                                              
1 When the District Court granted the defendants’ motions to dismiss and dismissed 
Cassell’s motion for a preliminary injunction, Cassell had not properly served Defendants 
Ramsey County and Seward.  The Court notified Cassell that he was required to properly 
serve Ramsey County and Seward within a specified time.  When Cassell failed to do so, 
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District Court’s dismissal of his complaint, but argues only that the District Court erred in 
dismissing as moot his motion for a preliminary injunction.2 
 We have appellate jurisdiction to review an order denying a motion for a 
preliminary injunction under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(1).  “We generally review a district 
court’s denial of a preliminary injunction for abuse of discretion but review the 
underlying factual findings for clear error and examine legal conclusions de novo.”  
Brown v. City of Pittsburgh, 586 F.3d 263, 268 (3d Cir. 2009).  
 The District Court properly dismissed as moot Cassell’s motion for a preliminary 
injunction.  Because the District Court entered a final order in the case, Cassell’s appeal 
of the dismissal of his motion for a preliminary injunction is moot.  See Hankins v. 
Temple Univ. (Health Scis. Ctr.), 829 F.2d 437, 438 n.1 (3d Cir. 1987) (“Appellant’s 
interlocutory appeal from the denial of her motion for a preliminary injunction was 
rendered moot by the issuance of the district court’s final order on the merits.”).  As that 
is the only issue before us, we will dismiss the appeal. 
 
                                              
the District Court dismissed all claims against them.  
2 In his brief on appeal, Cassell specifically states that, “Appellant will not be addressing 
the [D]istrict [C]ourt’s ruling on the complaint.”  Appellant’s Brief, at 6.  Because 
Cassell did not raise any argument regarding the District Court’s dismissal of his 
complaint, he has waived that issue on appeal.  United States v. Pelullo, 399 F.3d 197, 
222 (3d Cir. 2005) (“It is well settled that an appellant’s failure to identify or argue an 
issue in his opening brief constitutes waiver of that issue on appeal.”). 
